Moving a key out of a configuration file is only one part of credential management. A business also needs to know what the credential authorizes, where copies remain, when the running integration adopts a replacement, and how access is revoked. OpenClaw documents controls for these tasks, with important limits.
1. Inventory authority before choosing storage
Start with an inventory that contains identifiers and ownership, never secret values. Record the issuing service, account, permitted actions, runtime consumer, storage mechanism, expiry, and revocation procedure. Use separate business identities and the narrowest provider-side permissions available. Changing where a credential is stored does not reduce what its issuing service permits.
An illustrative operations assistant might use the following inventory. These are design examples, not evidence that a particular connector or customer deployment has been tested.
| Credential | Decision to record | Acceptance evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Model-provider API key | Project, spending controls, and owner | The intended project authenticates after rotation. |
| Business integration OAuth grant | Account, granted scopes, and revocation owner | Revoking the grant blocks a subsequent authorized test. |
| Gateway access credential | Clients using it and reconnection plan | Old access is rejected; intended clients reconnect. |
2. Match each credential to a supported mechanism
SecretRefs are opt-in references with source, provider, and id fields. The documented sources are env, file, exec, and store. Environment references read runtime variables; file references read a configured private file; exec providers run a configured resolver; store references use OpenClaw's shared SQLite secret store. Choose according to your existing operating model, not an assumption that all four provide equivalent isolation.
The store is Gateway-wide and team-scoped; it is not a separate vault for each employee. Its CLI masks secret-kind listings and refuses to print secret-kind values, while environment-kind values are readable. File references still depend on protecting the underlying file. Exec resolvers add executable code and an external dependency that operators must maintain.
Check the exact credential field in the official supported-surface reference. SecretRef support is not a blanket promise for every plugin setting, browser session, or OAuth credential.
3. Treat migration as a reviewed change
The documented operator workflow is audit, configure, dry-run apply, apply, audit again, then reload. Begin with openclaw secrets audit --check to identify plaintext, unresolved references, and credential-precedence issues. The configure planner requires an interactive terminal; it is not an unattended migration recipe.
Review the plan and its target fields before applying it. Exec-reference checks are skipped by default in audit and dry-run; opting into --allow-exec can execute resolver commands. A passing scan with skipped checks is not evidence that those resolvers work. The apply operation intentionally does not create rollback backups containing the old plaintext values.
Inspect copied configs, old model catalogs, archives, and backups separately. The audit has defined coverage and heuristic checks; it does not certify that every file is secret-free. Protect any recovery material under your organization's retention and access policy.
4. Verify adoption, not just a successful reload
OpenClaw resolves secrets into an in-memory runtime snapshot during activation. Runtime requests use that active snapshot rather than retrieving a fresh secret for every request. Updating an external secret manager is therefore not, by itself, proof that the running integration uses the replacement.
Current documentation describes owner-aware reloads. Healthy integrations can refresh while an eligible failed owner retains its last-known-good value, but only when its reference, provider definition, and non-secret configuration contract are unchanged. New or changed failures can become unavailable; strict failures reject the reload and preserve the active snapshot. A successful reload can consequently include degradation warnings.
For planned rotation, create a replacement using the provider's supported process, update the configured source, activate or reload as appropriate, inspect warnings, and perform a harmless authenticated check through the intended runtime. Use provider-side key identifiers or other non-secret evidence to distinguish the replacement from the old key. Revoke the old credential and verify it is rejected. If overlapping credentials are unsupported, schedule the interruption and a recovery path.
Suspected compromise changes that sequence: prioritize containment and provider-side revocation, accepting interruption where necessary. Do not keep a suspected stolen key active merely to achieve a seamless cutover.
5. Keep unsupported credentials and stored copies in scope
The supported-surface reference excludes classes such as model-auth OAuth refresh material and WhatsApp session credentials from the external SecretRef workflow. These need their own storage, refresh, revocation, and recovery procedures. Removing a local reference should not be treated as revoking authority at the issuing service.
SecretRefs are not process isolation. The runtime documentation explicitly says plaintext in agent-readable files remains readable through file or shell tools, and tool results and transcripts do not automatically mask it. Model-provider sentinel substitution reduces exposure along supported call paths, but the real credential still exists in process memory and at the final adapter boundary.
Treat the gateway as one trusted operating boundary, not an adversarial employee-separation mechanism. The storage guidance recommends dedicated business accounts, restricted state-directory access, and host disk encryption. It also distinguishes masked diagnostic surfaces from raw file logs and transcripts. Never test redaction by pasting a production key into chat.
6. Run a disposable rotation and revocation drill
Use a test account with limited authority and non-sensitive data. Record the OpenClaw version, credential field, provider configuration, runtime path, and observed result without recording credential values. The following are acceptance tests to perform, not claimed product guarantees or customer results.
- Replace a test key and prove the intended integration authenticates with the replacement.
- Make the test resolver unavailable during reload; record warnings, rejected reloads, and whether the integration retains old credentials or becomes unavailable.
- Revoke the old key at its issuer and verify a controlled request using it fails.
- Check defined audit targets and separately review accessible copies, logs, transcripts, and recovery material.
- For an OAuth integration, test its separate revoke-and-reconnect process rather than assuming the API-key procedure applies.
Assign three explicit owners
The business owner defines necessary access. The platform operator owns storage, activation, and runtime evidence. The credential issuer's administrator owns scope changes and revocation. One person may hold several roles, but each responsibility needs a named owner and a recorded test. Confirm behavior against the installed version before adopting this checklist as an operating procedure.
Sources and further reading
- OpenClaw: SecretRef contract and provider configuration
Checked October 15, 2026 - OpenClaw: supported and unsupported SecretRef credentials
Checked October 15, 2026 - OpenClaw: secrets CLI and migration workflow
Checked October 15, 2026 - OpenClaw: secrets runtime model and reload behavior
Checked October 15, 2026 - OpenClaw: secrets, storage, and logs
Checked October 15, 2026
Research-assisted writing by Santuri. Technical statements are grounded in the sources above, checked on the dates shown. Deployment requirements depend on your environment and installed version. Workflow examples are illustrations, not customer case studies.
Planning a deployment? Start with our enterprise OpenClaw guide and business workflow examples, or review our deployment approach.